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Article 2

RADIO V. ROYALTIES
INTRODUCTION

The Federal Constitution provides that Congress shall
have the power "... to promote the Progress of Science and
Useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings
and Discoveries." ' Acting under this authorization, in 1909,
when radio was a much more uncoordinated infant than television is to-day, Congress passed an act to codify the law
of copyrights. 2 Because of radio's relative obscurity at that
date it is deemed inconceivable that the national legislature
gave a great deal of attention to the possible effect of the
new invention in drafting the Act.' At any rate the lack
of specific treatment of radio broadcasting in it opened the
door to a Gargantuan struggle between the forces of the new
industry and organized Composers.
The fight for the Composers has been led by the American
Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers, a voluntary,
unincorporated, non-profit association. This group was organized in 1914, by Victor Herbert, John Philip Sousa, Gene
Buck and Nathan Burkan, and it now has a membership of
over 1,000 of the country's best composers. The organization became necessary for the purpose of controlling violations of the Copyright Act which could not be coped with
by individual action, because the expense involved in the
law suit would not justify action against the offenders. The
group has an extensive and almost fool-proof method of
uncovering violations of the act. They receive copies of all
programs to be given at clubs and other entertainment places
and these reports are sent to field representatives, who will
first give the offender three warnings and then prosecute
1

Article I, Sec. 8.
Copyright Act of March 4, 1909, c. 320, § 1, 35 Stat. 1075.
3 The subject of radio was first treated specifically by Federal Statute in 1910
-Ship Act of 1910, 36 Stat. 629.
2

RADIO V. ROYALTIES

with the full backing of the Society's resources. Radio programs formerly checked in this manner are now ignored
since all radio stations, as the result of the litigation of which
this article shall treat, now pay yearly licenses for the privilege of using the Society's songs.'
The omission in the Copyright Act caused the courts little
difficulty until 1923, fourteen years after its passage. Prior
to this time the radio industry had been passing through
successive stages of adolescence, and in 1923 it had reached
some measure of maturity. In that year the court was faced
with, the problem of how to apply the Copyright Act to
Radio.' Should it be strictly construed to favor the Radio
constituents or liberally construed at the instigation of the
Composers? The Court's decision in that year was to open
an extended controversy which this article shall attempt to
present in both the legal and economic aspects.
The axis of the contest is Section 1 (e) of the Copyright
Act of 1909 -s "Any person entitled thereto upon complying with the provisions of this title, shall have the exclusive right ... to perform the copyrighted work publicly for
profit, if it be a musical composition and for the purpose
of public performance for profit. . ." The application of this
section to the rendition by radio of copyrighted musical selections presents several problems:
1. Is such a rendition "for profit" within the meaning-of
the Act?
2. Is it a "public performance" within the meaning of
the Act?
3. And to just what extent may reception constitute a
"public performance for profit" within the meaning of the
Act?
REYADE's DioEsT, Je. 1939, p. 95, "Our Music Masters."
5 M. Witmark and Sons v. L. Bainberger and Co., 291 F. 776 (D. C. N. J.,
1923).
6 Supra note 2
4
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I.

LEGAL ASPECTS

A. What Constitutes Profit?
Legal opinion of the first of these submitted questions was
not uniform at the early stages of the controversy. In 1915
the Circuit Court of Appeals ' held that the words "for profit" in the Copyright Act contemplated a direct charge for
the performance, such as an admission fee. The court ruled
that a mere performance in a dining room for the entertainment of guests was not a performance for "profit."
This would seem to conform with the more accepted meaning of the term. Webster says "profit" is "the excess of returns over expenditures, in a given transaction or series of
transactions." The same lexicography states another definition to be -"advantage or benefit"; however, this is marked
obsolete.8 Nevertheless it would seem that the courts were
later to seize upon the second definition in their interpretation of the Act.
Another case not involving a radio performance followed
the lead of the Hilliard Hotel Case,9 in 1915,' ° but upon
appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States, Mr. Justice Holmes in writing the opinion condemned the strict
construction of the word "profit." In doing so he said:
"If rights under the copyright are infringed only by a performance where money is taken at the door they are very
imperfectly protected. Performances not different in kind
from those of the defendant's might compete with and even
destroy the success of the monopoly that the law intends
the plaintiff to have. It is enough that there is no need to
construe the statute so narrowly. The defendant's performances are not eleemosynary. They are a part of a total for
which the public pays, and the fact that the price of the
whole is attributed to a particular item which those present
John Church Co. v. Hilliard Hotel Co., 221 F. 229 (C. C. A. 2d, 1915).
Webster's New International, Second Ed. (1936).
9 Supra note 7.
10 Herbert v. Shanley Co., 222 F. 344 (S.D. N. Y., 1915).
7
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are expected to order is not important.. It is true that music
is not the sole object, but neither is food, which probably
could be gotten cheaper elsewhere. The object is repast in
surroundings that to people having a limited power of conversation or disliking the rival noise give a luxurious pleasure
not to be had from eating a silent meal. If music did not pay
it would be given up. If it pays it pays out of the public's
pocket. Whether it pays or not the purpose of employing it
is profit and that is enough." 11
In view of this decision it would seem but a logical transition to extend the application of Holmes' view to radio
broadcasting for advertising purposes. It was found so by
the District Court of New Jersey in M. Witmark and Sons
v. L. Bamberger Co.12 In that case the defendant was the
owner of a large department store, in which, among other
things, it sold radios. Defendant also owned broadcasting
station WOR. Throughout the day interspersed among
the various programs the station gave its call letters, and
in doing so it drew attention to the fact that L. Bamberger
Co. owns one of the world's greatest stores. In one of its
broadcasts, it rendered the copyrighted selection "Mother
Macree." The plaintiff sought to enjoin a reoccurence of
such a performance, on the ground that it was an unauthorized public performance for profit and as such was forbidden by Section 1 (e) of the Copyright Act of 1909."3 The defendant denied the broadcast of the selection was for profit
since there was no charge made to the listeners for the privilege of hearing the program. The court in discounting this
contention adopted Justice Holmes reasoning in Herbert v.
Shanley.' It said in effect that a department store is not
an eleemosynary institution, but one conducted primarily
for profit, and since the costs of the .broadcasting were
charged directly against the general expenses of the busi11

242 U. S. 591, 37 Sup. Ct. 232, 61 L. Ed. 511 (1917).

12

Supra note 5.

13

Supra note 2.

14

Supra note 11.
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ness, it is part and parcel of the business system, and sale
of radios is the aim of the broadcasts, even though such an
objective may not be realized. Hence it cannot be said that
the broadcasts of the defendant are not at least of indirect
profit to it within the rule of the Shanley Case."
However, a year later the District Court of Ohio "6repudiated such an application, though the Bamberger Case 11
was cited in the plaintiff's briefs. The facts of the case were
these: the complainant owned a copyrighted piece "Dreamy
Melody" which was rendered over the station owned by
the defendant. The defendant had no authority from the
complainants. The court accepted as a fact that the defendant's station was operated by it solely for the purpose of stimulating interest in the defendant's radios, but
denied that such advertising value constituted "profit" within the contemplation of the authors of the Copyright Act.
The court said that - "While these statutes should be given
a fair and reasonable construction, with a view to protecting
the author in such a manner that he may have the benefit of
the property right conferred for a limited term of years, it
is clear that this protection should not be extended beyond
the express language of the statute, nor a property right
created which was clearly not within the mind of Congress
when the Act was passed." The court concluded that a
direct payment was the essence of the term "profit" and that
it contemplated something vastly different from the indirect
value within the purport of the Bamberger Case. 8
This decision did not stand long, and upon its appeal to
the Circuit Court of Appeals in 1925 the opinion delivered
there by Judge Mack did much to settle the issue definitely
in favour of the copyright owners and against the young
A public
radio industry. The learned judge said,' 9 "...
15
16
F. 628
17

Supra note 11.
Jerome H. Remick and Co. v. American Automobile Accessories Co., 298
(S.D. Ohio, 1924).
Supra note 5.
18 Supra note 5.
19 5 F. 2d 411 (C. C. A. 6th, 1925), reversing 298 F. 628.
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performance may be for profit though no admission fee is
exacted or no profit actually made. It suffices . . . that the
purpose of the performance be for profit, and not eleemosynary; it is against a commercial as destinguished from a
purely philanthropic, public use of another's composition
that the act is directed. It is immaterial, in our judgment,
whether the commercial use be such as to secure direct payment for the performance by each listener; or indirect payment as by a hat checking charge, when no. admission fee
is required, or a general commercial advantage as by advertising one's name in the expectation or hope of making
profits through the sale of one's products, be they radio or
other goods."
This decision is rather strong in view of the fact that the
only possible. advertising on the entire program was the announcement of the call letters "WLW" plus "The Crosley
Manufacturing Company, Cincinnati, Ohio." This fragmentary announcement would seem to be more of an identification than an advertisement, however, the court was of a
different opinion.
B.

Public Performance

Of course to hold a broadcaster or listener liable for an
infringement of the Copyright Act it must be shown not only
that the performance was for "profit" but also that it was
a "public performance." This leads to a discussion of the
second proposed problem: "Is the rendition of a copyrighted
selection by radio, a "public performance" within the scope
of the Copyright Act?
The first case involving the question of radio infringement,
M. Witmark and Sons v. L. Bamberger and Co." failed to
discuss the question, it perhaps was assumed by counsel that
the act of defendant constituted a public performance. At
any rate the defense centered its attention on an attack
20

Supra note S.
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which denied that the performance was for "profit." The
court presumably held that the broadcast did constitute a
public performance, since its verdict was for the plaintiff,
who was given injunctive relief.
In Jerome H. Remick Co. v. American Automobile Accessories Co. 2 1 the point was specifically attacked by the de-

fendant, who contended that since the listeners were not
congregated together, and could not communicate with each
other, there could be no "public performance" but rather a
series of private performances not within the scope of the
terms as they are set out in the Act. The Ohio District Court
sustained this contention, 2 and according to its decision a
performance in order to be "public" within the contemplation of the Act of 1909 must be directed toward a physically
congregated assembly. Copyrights, the court maintained, receive their protection from a statutory source, and from that
source only, and since the plaintiff's recovery under such
statute was an-arbitrary sum based upon no showing of
actual damages, the statute should be strictly interpreted.
Bearing this in mind the court found it impossible to rule
that the defendant's conduct constituted a public performance. The judge explained that his decision was not in any
way in conflict with Herbert v. Shanley,2" because in that
case there was an actual physical congregation for whom the
artist directly performed; while in the case of a radio broadcast the court reasoned, there is no such an assembly, and no
such direct performance, hence a radio rendition of a copyrighted composition does not violate the rule laid down in
the Shanley Case. 4
The Circuit Court in reviewing this decision 25 said that
the question would certainly be ripe for some clarifying legislation but since none had been enacted, it was necessary to
21
22
23

24

25

Supra note
Supra note
Supra note
Supra note
Supra note

19.
16.
11.
11.
19.
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discover if by reasonable interpretation the Copyright Act
could properly embrace the new situation. The court found
that it could and that the defendant had given a 'public
performance" within the meaning of the act, even though
specific treatment is lacking in the Act. Judgment was rendered by Judge Mack, who ruled - "A performance in our
judgment is no less public because the listeners are unable
to communicate with one another, or are not assembled within an enclosure, or gathered together in some open stadium
or park or other public place. Nor can a performance in our
judgment be deemed private because each listener may enjoy it alone or in the privacy of his home. Radio broadcasting is intended to, and in fact does, reach a very much larger
number of the public at the moment of rendition than any
other medium of performance. The artist is consciously addressing a great, though unseen and widely scattered, audience, and is therefore participating in a public performance."
A new note arose in Jerome H. Remick and Co. v. General
Electric Co."6 In a hearing in the New York District Court
it was assumed by the judge that the entertainer singing the
song had been authorized to do so, and that the defendant
by allowing her the facilities of its station did not thereby
become an infringer. The court could not reconcile itself to
a finding that there were two public performances in the act
of singing into the microphone which was placed in a public
place. It said that the microphone merely gave the singer
a larger audience and that the performance is one and the
same to the listener in the same ro6m with the artist and the
listener miles away. However, in a final hearing of the case,
it was discovered that the original performance by the artist
had-been unauthorized and hence it was decided that the defendant was liable as a co-infringer. This finding of course
made the decision in the earlier hearing mere dicta, since
the problem therein presented was not necessary to the decision of the case. This dicta has not been followed to any
26 4 F. 2d 160 (S. D. N. Y., 1924).
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extent in the later cases, 7 and the prevailing view seems to
be that of Judge Mack in the American Automobile Association Case.28
In 1926 the Act was interpreted to extend to one who
picked up another's unauthorized rendition and retransmitted it.29 It was argued by defendant's counsel that those who
listen cannot be held as infringers, so how can it be that
one who merely permits others to hear someone else's broadcast is a co-infringer with the original broadcaster. Counsel
advanced the analogy of the open window, comparing the
act of opening up a microphone to a forbidden broadcast,
to the opening up of a window so that the passers-by might
hear the broadcast. The court held, however, that the analogy would not fit as the rebroadcaster is equipped with electrical instruments, for the purpose of translating the sounds
into electric energy, in order to send them over vast territories. The rebroadcaster acts through his electrical machines, and is not merely a passive element. Hence the window analogy advanced so strenuously by the radio constituency was discarded by the courts.
The English Courts, under a similar act, would seem to
be in accord with the view of Judge Mack. In Messager v.
British Broadcasting Co.,3" the defendant hired singers and
an orchestra to give a performance of the opera "The Little
Michus" which was protected extensively by the plaintiff's
copyrights. This performance was given in defendant's private studio at Savoy Hill, to which the public was not invited. The performance was, however, broadcast, and the
court decided that there was a "public performance." - "It
was by means of electrical instruments that the defendants
by modulating the waves in the ether, were able to affect,
as they intended to affect, a vast number of electrical in27 Society of European Stage and Composers v. New York Hotel Statler Co.,
19 F. Supp. 1 (1937).
28 Supra note 19.
29 Supra note 26.
90 2 K. B. 543 (1927).
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struments possessed by members of the public, and thereby
to render audible to that public the performance given within
the walls of the defendant's studio. In my view, however,
the defendants in doing what they did, clearly gave a public
performance. Instead of gathering the public into a vast
assembly room, they set in motion certain ether waves,
knowing that millions of receiving instruments in houses
and flats were tuned to the waves sent forth, and knowing
and intending also that acoustic representation of the opera
would thereby be given to an enormous number of listeners.
If I did not hold this to be a public performance by the defendants I should fail to recognize the substance and reality
of the matter, and also the object and intent of the Copyright Act." It is to be remembered that radio in England is
operated by the government, hence this decision in effect
amounts to a self-imposed penalty which makes it even more
significant.
C. Infringement by Reception
A consideration of the third problem - "To just what
extent may amplified reception constitute a public performance for profit within the meaning of the Act? "-would be

greatly aided by an examination of the cases in which the
question was raised.
In the most recent case, 3 the defendant a hotel company,
had a receiving set iii each room for the accommodation of
its guests. A system of master receivers and wires, controlled
by the management and piped to each room-receiver gave
the guest a choice of two stations, each representing the local
outlet of competing national chains. The plaintiff complained
that in thus making available a copyrighted piece, the defendants gave a "public performance for profit" within the
meaning of the Copyright Act. This contention was supported by the court even in the face of the fact that the
broadcasting station had been licensed to originate the song
31

Supra note 27.
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ovel the air. The court holding for the plaintiff, also denied
the contention of the defendant that the guests had a choice,
and that there could be no public performance since all the
guests were separated by the walls of their respective rooms.
In negation the court said the act constituted a "public performance for profit" because it took place in a hotel, under
the control of the management and furnished part of the
consideration for the room rental.
Slightly less strong but to the same general effect is the
decision in Buck v. Jewel-LaSalle Realty Co., 2 in which
case the defendant was the owner of the LaSalle Hotel in
Kansas City. This hotel had, through the medium of a master
radio, received programs from the broadcasting station of one
Duncan. Both Duncan and the defendant were warned by
the plaintiff's society, an organization of composer and authors, that any transmission of a copyrighted song owned
by the Society would be considered a violation of that
body's copyright. Despite the warning, Duncan continued
to broadcast and on numerous occasions the defendant, to
receive renditions of prohibited songs. These songs as in
the occasion in suit were further amplified, and wired to the
rooms where they were made audible to such guests as desired to hear them. The plaintiff contended that the defendant was guilty of giving a "public performance for profit"
in violation of the Federal Copyright Act. The defendant
denied that there was any such performance involved in its
action, and tried to persuade the court that the liability
should be limited to the original broadcaster, the hotel being a mere passive listener. But the court rejected this contention and held the wiring of the program to the rooms
with increased amplification was an independent performance. They ruled that there could be inumerable separate
public performances resulting from one broadcast. By dicta,
they did somewhat confine their "Frankenstein" by say82

283 U. S. 191, 51 Sup. Ct. 410 (1931).
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ing reception in a private home for the benefit of guests
would not be contrary to the Statute.
Despite what one might think of the reasonableness of
the previously stated cases it would seem the protection is
not unreasonably extended in Jerome Remick v. General
Electric Co.,"3 in which case the defendant owned a broadcasting station, the maintenance of which was justified by its
value as an advertising medium for the defendant's products. In the operation of this station the defendant picked
up and retransmitted to its own listeners a program emanating from another station, which contained a copyrighted
number owned by the plaintiffs, who brought an action, for
violation of the Federal Copyright Act. 4 The defendant
contended that it took no part in the original transmission,
and hence its conduct was merely passive and did not constitute a "public performance for profit." The court in dicta
implied that mere reception without retransmission would
not be actionable but stated that the pick-up and rebroadcast of the defendant constituted affirmative action. It denied the defendant's contention that he had merely "opened
a window" and allowed listeners to hear a song emanating
elsewhere. Perhaps -this decision would afford enough protection to a copyright, without extending liability to a mere
unified system of private reception such as frequently exists
in hotels and restaurants. The dicta, however, has been
universally disregarded in the later decisions as may be noticed from a reading of the two cases stated immediately
previous.
Those two cases also show a departure of judicial thought
from the decision in a 1929 case, 5 which though it has never
been expressly overruled has certainly received no support
in the later decisions. In that case the plaintiff as president
of the American Society of Composers, Authors and Publish33 16 F. 2d 829 (1926).
34

35

Supra note 2.
Buck v. De Baum, 40 F. 2d 734 (1929).
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ers, brought suit against the defendant a cafeteria owner who
had tuned in on a broadcast of the "Indian Love Call" a
copyrighted musical selection, the broadcasting of which
had been licensed. The defendant merely turned the dial of
a receiver, located in his cafeteria, and by this act made the
song audible to his guests. The plaintiff contended that in
so doing the defendant violated the copyright by giving an
unauthorized "public performance for profit." The court
refused to accept this contention and absolved the defendant.
The plaintiff in the judge's contemplation, had by authorizing the broadcast, impliedly assented to any pick-up of the
program. He said that if the plaintiff wished to prevent reception of the selection it could very well have forbidden the
broadcast. Particularly to the point was his closing reagoning,
in which he said: ". . . if during the reception of such programs, one using the radio in his business is required to turn
the dial of his receiving set so as to render inaudible any
copyrighted composition the utmost difficulty and confusion
will result, and a condition ensue that to my mind is unreasonable and one that was never within the intent of Congress in passing the Copyright Act or within the reasonable
purview of the terms thereof."
If this judge's view is the more reasonable construction of
the act it is unfortunately not followed in the United States.
Nor is the English view under a similar Act any less compromising, a result which might be expected in view of the
English policy of exclusive governmental operation of broadcasting stations. There in a recent Chancery case,86 it was
held that a person who makes a copyrighted musical composition available to the public, by receiving and amplifying
that composition through the medium of a receiving set, is
guilty of a copyright infringement, and it is no excuse that
the original broadcast was licensed, because such license
only extended to reception for domestic and private entertainment.
86

Ch. 121 (1934).
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Perhaps the most amazing extension of copyright protection is evinced in the English case, Performing Right Society Ltd. v. Camelo. The court ruled in that case, that a
person owning a radio in a private room adjoining a public
restaurant, was guilty of an infringement of the Copyright
Act, since the connecting door was frequently open for service. The court ruled that reception of a copyrighted number over this set rendered the owner of the radio liable for
giving a "public performance" in violation of the English
Copyright Act.
D.

Legal Conclusions

From a perusal of the cases already discussed it would
seem that the following answers, to the previously proposed questions, may be made:
1. Radio rendition of a copyrighted musical composition
may constitute a performance for profit, if there is the slightest and most indirect connection between the monetary gain
of the person or group responsible for the rendition and the
broadcast. Any unauthorized broadcast of a copyrighted
piece having the slightest advertising value to the business
of the broadcaster is a performance for profit.
2. Such rendition constitutes a public performance even
though those who hear it are separated by great distances
and physical barriers.
3. Even mere amplified reception may constitute a public performance for profit, if the other conditions are fulfilled. That is if such reception is in a public place, and is
of value to the owner thereof. The courts have, however, refused to hold that a private person may not entertain his
guests with radio reception of copyrighted pieces, as this is
neither a public performance, nor a performance for profit.
It will also be seen from the cases that the Composers
have won most of the important court battles and that a
37

3 All E. R. 557 (1936).
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liberal interpretation of the act, in their favour prevails. Of
course, as might be imagined the radio industry has fiercely
resisted this tendency of the courts, to, as they call it, "judicially legislate." In 1935 they made an attempt to break
up the American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers, when at that time the NationalAssociation of Broadcasters appealed to the Justice Department to dissolve the
Society as being in violation of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act,
but after the case had progressed for a very short time the
government requested and obtained an adjournment, and
has never re-opened the proceeding, though the indictment
still stands." It now appears therefore that the law as far as
the courts are concerned is definitely settled in regard to
radio violation of the Copyright Act.
E.

Attempted Legislation

A determined effort has been made by the radio industry
to push through Congress the Vestal Bill,3 9 which would deal
specifically with the problem of radio copyright infringement,
and would relieve the receiver from any liability unless he
charges a direct admission fee for entrance upon the premises where the radio is placed. The bill passed the House after
much argument but failed in the Senate.
Mr. Tydings in 1931,40 introduced a bill to amend section 1 of the Act of 1909, it provided in effect that the original sale of sheet music implied consent to the subsequent
public performance of the composition for profit. This bill
also failed to pass. In 1935, another bill,41 entitled An Act
To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright,
was introduced; this bill also attempted to exempt radio receivers from liability unless admission or cover charges were
made upon entrance. Another bill was introduced in 1935,42
38

39
40

Supra note 4.
House Rep. 12549, 71st Congress, Second Sess.
Bill S. 1035.

41 Bill S. 2465.
42

Senate Bill 3047.
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by Mr. Duffy, to 'limit liability under the Act of 1909, but
although the bill passed the Senate, the House did not act
upon it. At the date of thi§ writing there are no modifications
of the Act of 1909 which would affect radio.
II.

ECONOMIC ASPECT

Having seen that the legal aspect of the controversy is at
least temporarily settled in favour of a liberal construction
of the Copyright Act, let us examine the economic aspect of
the situation, in an attempt to find some reason for the rigorous struggle of the composers against unauthorized radio
broadcasting and reception.
It is the contention of the radio industry, that the radio
is a great boon to the Composers whose songs are, by its wave
lengths, made audible to thousands of listeners, and hence
are given invaluable advertising, which greatly enhances
the popularity of the songs. This view is given legal credence
by Judge Lynch in M. Witmark and Sons v. L. Bamberger
and Co.,43 for though he upholds the plaintiff's injunction
suit, he does say - "Our own opinion of the possibilities
of advertising by radio lead us to the belief that the broadcasting of a newly copyrighted musical composition would
greatly enhance the sales of the printed sheets. But the copyright owners and the music publishers themselves are perhaps the best judges of the method of popularizing musical
selections."
Naturally if this were true the composers would welcome
radio renditions of their pieces. However, their actions are
motivated by very convincing statistics. In the middle "nineteen-twenties" the song "Till We Meet Again" sold 6,500,000
copies for an all-time high in popular music sale. The best
selling songs since 1933 have sold well under the 300,000
copy mark. Since the composer's share in the proceeds from
this sale is three cents a copy royalty, and a small percentage
43

Supra note S.
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on phonograph records, it can readily be seen that this discrepancy in sales volume is of real concern to song-writers,
who cannot live on uneompensated genius. 4
One may question the contention of the Composers that
radio brought about this precipitous decline in the sale of
sheet music. It might even be suggested that the quantity
slump was attributable to a corresponding deterioration in
the quality of more recent compositions. However, the Composers deny this and cite the case of Irving Berlin, whose
1926 song "All Alone" sold 1,125,000 copies, and earned
for him $80,000 in royalties, whereas the same composer's
"best sellers" since 1933 "How Deep Is the Ocean?" and
"Say It Isn't So" sold only 225,000 copies each.4" Has Berlin's genius so declined? ask the Composers.
As a much more plausible explanation the Composers suggest that there is a very significant clue in the inverse ratio
exhibited between the rise of radio and the decline of sheet
music sale. This explanation, they contend, is logical enough.
The more pleasing songs are naturally enough most frequently played over the air, and it being a human characteristic to react unfavorably toward constant repetition, a
song which without radio would move more slowly and
searchingly over the country, now reaches its apex of popularity and inevitable decline in a much shorter time.
Believing as they do in the soundness of their theories,
the Composers through the agency of the American Society
of Composers, Authors, and Publishers,have carried on their
fight for survival, and indeed if their premises are sound they
do so with reason. The controversy may become even more
intense in the near future as the present contracts with the
radio stations expire this year,46 and the Radio industry
may fail to meet with the terms of the Society.
Jack C. Hynes.
44
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